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This study is part of the FARMAF project, which investigates tools for agricultural 
risk management in three African countries. FARMAF has developed pilot projects 
in Burkina Faso with warehouse receipt financing and crop insurance in the period 
2012-2016, in a collaboration between a national farmers organisation – CPF - 
and a network of European universities – among them CIRAD France and 
Wageningen University and Research, Netherlands.  
The FARMAF project has supported the community warehouse infrastructure in 10 
rural communities, by constructing 8 new warehouses and rehabilitating 2 others. 
It has also donated warehouse equipment, organised trainings for warehouse 
committees, and developed agreements with two microfinance institutions.  In crop 
insurance, FARMAF has introduced insurance in 31 villages, in collaboration with 
Planet Guarantee and 2 microfinance institutions. The insurance covers drought 
risk in maize, and is structured as a weather index insurance. 
 
The objective of this study is to explore whether and how FARMAF’s risk 
management tools have improved the farmers’ access to finance, and to what 
extent upscaling of this financial access is possible. This study is qualitative and 
exploratory in nature. It’s methodology is based on 25 semi-structured interviews 
with different actors involved: farmers (f/m), warehouse committees, 
representatives of farmers’ organisations, marketing cooperatives, microfinance 
institutions, insurance-related actors, processing companies, resource persons, 
and the project implementers (CPF and CIRAD). The interviews and field visits 
were held in November and December 2015. Field visits took place in Western 
Burkina Faso, where FARMAF pilot areas are located.  
 
The study focused on the maize value chain, because the insurance covers 
drought risk in maize and the warehousing included maize among other cereals. 
The cashew value chain was treated as a comparison, to explore to what extent 
the risk management tools could be replicable to an entirely different chain. 
1. Wageningen Economic Research, The Netherlands 
2. Independent consultant, Burkina Faso 
* This research brief was written on the basis of the working paper “Etude sur la gestion des risques et 
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1. Financing in the maize value chain 
The financing needs in the maize value chain 
vary greatly. The production costs can be used 
as a proxy for the financing needs, whether 
financed externally or with internal resources of 
the producer. A traditional farmer with half a 
hectare of maize would typically invest € 36 in 
inputs and labour, or € 110 if he uses animal 
traction on a full hectare of maize. A mechanised 
farmer with 2.2 hectares of maize on average 
would need € 325 to finance his costs of 
production, plus financing for his investments in 
equipment (Ouédraogo et al, 2011).1 
The average financing needs in processing and 
trade are far larger, because the businesses are 
larger. In maize processing, the annual costs of 
production per processor range from roughly EUR 
3,400 (small processor) to EUR 380,000 
(industrial processor). In maize trade, the costs 
per trader vary from EUR 11,000-12,000 (small 
buyers, retailers) to EUR 82,000 for wholesale 
traders. The actual financing needs for traders 
and processors may be a fraction of the annual 
production costs, because the stocks rotate 
several times throughout the year. 
Direct financing to the trading segment is the 
most important source of financing for maize. 
This direct financing is provided by banks and 
microfinance institutions. Another important 
source for maize trading is supplier credit: farmers 
delivering their produce to their producer 
organisations, who can only pay them when they 
have received their payment from their buyers 
(traders or public institutions). (source: interviews 
with resource persons). 
For the production segment (maize farming), 
the most important source is indirect 
financing through the cotton chain. As cotton 
farmers diverted part of the inputs to their maize 
plots, the cotton companies deliberately started to 
supply inputs for the food crops of their farmers. 
(Guenot & Huchet-Bourdon 2014). To some 
extent direct financing of production does take 
                                                     
1 The average farm sizes mentioned  for each farmer segment 
are outcomes of the national household survey by DGPER-
INERA/ AFRICA RICE, cited by Ouédraogo (2011). 
place, but only where the financing risk can be 
mitigated through collateral or through reduction 
of risks. Warehouse receipt financing and crop 
insurance are examples of such risk mitigation 
tools.  
Access to finance is most problematic for the 
segments production (farming) and 
processing, and in general for longer-term 
investments. The trading segment – and to some 
extent the processing segment - is more 
generously financed, because financial 
institutions’ classical products (f.i. inventory credit, 
trade finance) are more adapted to them, in terms 
of loan sizes, securities and repayment frequency, 
and financial institutions are more familiar and 
comfortable with these businesses (Yago et al, 
2016). 
 
2. Warehouse receipt financing 
Warehouse receipt financing is not yet wide-
spread in Burkina Faso, but rather an emerging 
financing product. As a latest national estimate, in 
2012 the total number of community warehouses 
in Burkina Faso was estimated exceeding 100 
with more than 3850 farmers involved (Ghione et 
al, 2013).  
 
Stocks of produce in the 10 FARMAF-
supported warehouses have been growing 
consistently. In the period 2012-2015, the total 
volume of products stocked has grown from 257 T 
to 407 T. The warehouses are now operating at 
roughly 2/3 of their capacity. 
 
The loan volume in warehouse receipt 
financing has hardly grown in the three past 
years, although the volume of stocks 
increased substantially. A total loan volume of 
around EUR 30,000 per year was issued. This is 
a surprising outcome, because it is often assumed 
that access to loans is the prime objective of the 
WRF system. It was not clear from the field 
research whether the credit was limited at the 
supply side, or whether the demand for loans 
through the WRF system was basically satisfied. 
Further research into this phenomenon would be 
helpful, to clarify the conditions for further 
upscaling of WRF.  
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Warehouse receipt financing is part of the 
seasonal cash flow of the farmers’ household 
economy, rather than being part of a vertical 
value chain like maize or cereals. Farmers are 
storing not only maize, but a variety of food and 
cash crops (sorghum, millet, maize, beans, 
cowpeas, sesame, peanuts). The warehouse 
receipt loans are used to finance a variety of 
activities: 59% for the cotton harvest (harvest 
labour), and the rest for other income generating 
activities (petty trade, fattening of chicken or 
goats, horticulture gardening), school fees, etc. 
The loans are also repaid with a variety of income 
sources, often with the proceeds of the activities 
financed (income generating activities cited 
above), and not always with the sales of the 
grains stocked.  
Cereals stocking adds to the farmers’ risk 
management strategy and food security and 
thus has a merit of its own, whether or not it 
provides access to a loan. Only 2/3 of the bags 
stored are used as collateral for a warehouse 
receipt loan. The other part – increasing over the 
years from 10% to 1/3 - constitute savings free 
from any obligation. Similarly at the moment of 
destocking: only about 70% of the cereals are 
sold, whereas the other 30% is kept for family 
food security during the “hunger season” (food, 
feed, seed). 
The warehouses are part of an “outlet 
portfolio” for the farmers, who can choose to 
keep the cereals in their homes, sell them, or 
stock them in different community warehouses. 
This would indicate that farmers prefer to diversify 
their market outlets for grains, possibly to spread 
risks, or to grasp opportunities provided by traders 
and/or non-profit entities (public entities, farmer 
organisations, NGOs). This could also challenge 
the impact assumption that all the cereals stocked 
in the FARMAF warehouses would otherwise be 
sold immediately after the harvest; part of it may 
have gone to the expense of stocking in other 
warehouses, which could dilute the impact in 
terms of higher sales prices. More research would 
be needed to disentangle this phenomenon. 
 
The warehouses are not fully financially sus-
tainable. The warehouse fee covers the direct 
stocking expenses, but does not include 
depreciation or larger repairs of the warehouse 
building and equipment. At the same time, the 
warehouse committees seem well organised, and 
capable to mobilize support and funds for larger 
repairs or replacements. This does indicate a 
certain degree of sustainability of the warehouse 
system. 
The warehouse receipt lending is fairly 
standardized. The stocks are valued against one 
standard price, and the loans are standardized at 
70-80% of the stock value. Also the de-stocking 
moment is standardized. This standardization 
keeps the system simple and transparent, which 
is easy to manage for the warehouse committees 
and easy to monitor for the lending institutions. 
 
The MFIs seem to be comfortable to provide 
the WRF service. They consider it a loan product 
that they can offer virtually risk-free (100% 
repayment in the analysed period), and without 
investing too much in monitoring and oversight. 
The key moments are the inventory control at the 
moment of issuing the loan, and the destocking 
combined with repayment of the loan. In between 
there is a monthly inventory control, which is 
sometimes skipped by the MFI when they fully 
trust the warehouse committee. With the loan 
amounts per warehouse around EUR 3,000, 
which is small but not micro size, this modest 
frequency of oversight is perfectly feasible for the 
MFI. The MFIs declare that they consider the 
warehouse committees well-trained, which makes 
them trust-worthy in managing the stock and 
avoiding losses or deterioration of the product. A 
few cases of stock deterioration have taken place, 
which have led to improvement in stocking 
routines. One MFI offers a substantial interest rate 
discount for WRF (6% instead of 10% for similar 
loans). 
 
3. Crop insurance 
Crop insurance is a relatively new product in 
Burkina Faso, launched in 2011. Planet 
Guarantee – with a number of partners - has 
developed crop insurance for cotton and cereals 
(maize, millet, sorghum). The number of farmers 
participating on an annual basis varies  between 
5198 (2015/2016) and 9627 farmers (2014-2015) 
(Planet Guarantee 2016).  
 
In 2012, FARMAF agreed with Planet Guarantee 
to expand its drought risk insurance for maize to 
31 villages in the FARMAF regions. The number 
of farmers insured in the broader FARMAF region 
grew from 203 (2013) to 970 (2015). This seems 
to suggest rapid growth, but much of this growth 
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was realized by further “horizontal expansion” to 
other villages in the same region, outside the 31 
selected by FARMAF. We have no specific data 
on the number of insured farmers in the 31 
villages, but the impact survey  of FARMAF 
reveals that – out of a survey population of 465 
farmers – the number of insured farmers grew 
from 24 (2013) to 33 (2015). This gives an uptake 
rate that increases from 5% to 7%, which is rather 
limited. 
The limited uptake of insurance is further 
confirmed by a few factors. First, one of the 
participating MFIs – APFI - shows erratic outreach 
figures, rather than consistent growth. From the 
interviews, it seems that APFI had limitations of 
loan capital in those years, which has forced them 
to limit their credit activities. As insurance is most 
often bundled with credit, this could explain the 
decrease in insurance clients from the supply 
side. Second, at the demand side, there are 
indications that the adoption of insurance is not 
always stable. The interviews indicated that a 
number of clients were disappointed in the 
insurance. Some of them had expected more 
frequent pay-outs, as they stated that drought 
takes place every 2-3 years (this seems to be too 
high an expectation, as the insurance is designed 
for more extreme and this less frequent droughts). 
Others didn’t consider it fair that their neighbours 
had been compensated for drought and they 
hadn’t (the drought index is calculated along 
rectangular gridlines, rather than natural barriers).  
Other farmers were disappointed that the 
insurance did not cover excess rain or 
inundations. There seemed to be a portion of 
clients that tried out the insurance and dropped 
out after being disappointed. We didn’t have data 
to quantify this phenomenon, and thus cannot 
corroborate to what extent the client base of the 
insurance consists of “repeated users” or “first-
time users”. 
The sustainability of the insurance product 
still seems to be fragile. For the MFIs, the 
insurance product is profitable. They gain through 
the premium commissions earned, and through 
the fact that their maize portfolio is better 
protected against drought risk. However, the 
product is not yet profitable for the insurance-
related companies. For example Planet 
Guarantee, the insurance broker, would need a 
much higher volume of insurance operations in 
Burkina Faso to break even (90,000 clients). 
Added to that, the costs could be underestimated: 
from the field interviews it appeared that the 
communication to clients about the insurance 
product could be improved and intensified, which 
would still add to the costs for the MFIs or for the 
insurance-related companies. 
 
The loan volumes attached to the insurance – 
in the broader FARMAF region - grew substan-
tially, from € 33,000 (2013) to € 122,000 (2015). 
There is a practically linear relationship between 
the insurance premiums paid and the credit 
volumes attached to the insurance. So, the 
insurance has indeed mobilised a proportional 
loan volume. 
 
Most of the clients opt for the bundled 
credit+insurance, and only few opt for the 
stand-alone insurance without a loan. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the premium income is 
as high as one would expect when all the 
premiums were related to credits insured.  
It is possible that the same clients had 
received similar loans in previous seasons, 
without  the insurance cover attached. From our 
research we cannot confirm with certainty that the 
loans could only be issued with the insurance in 
place. More research into client data of the MFIs 
would be needed to disentangle this possibility. 
 
4. Upscaling potential 
WRF: in absolute numbers, the loan portfolio 
related to the warehouse system is small. We did 
not see signs of a growth acceleration of this 
product. Although the MFIs are comfortable with 
the product, they seem to take a stand-by attitude, 
waiting until the product is demanded, rather than 
going out and actively promoting the WRF 
product. They seem to consider such promotion 
the responsibility of development agencies, who 
help the communities to invest in the warehouses 
and equipment and to train the warehouse 
committees. This would imply that the replication 
of the WRF system seems to depend more on the 
development actors, who create more 
warehouses with well-trained warehouse 
committees. 
Insurance: the loan portfolio is somewhat larger 
than for the WRF system, but that is largely due to 
“horizontal expansion”: the uptake rate is still 
rather limited. The MFIs are comfortable with the 
product. Yet they are quite dependent on the 
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insurance-related actors to offer the product. For 
Planet Guarantee, gradual upscaling would 
depend on fresh project subsidies (their current 
model). For breaking-even, a faster upscaling 
would be necessary: one option to achieve that is 
to make the insurance compulsory, as a 
government policy. Efforts to that effect are being 
made by Planet Guarantee and other actors.  
In conclusion, the upscaling of the crop insurance 
as a sustainable business model would require a 
break-through in the product uptake, either by 
making it a more convincing product for the 
farmers, or by making it compulsory if farmers 
wish to have a loan. In any case, more intensive 
communication to clients is recommended, so that 
the clients have realistic expectations about the 
insurance product. 
 
Loan capital available at the MFI is a limiting 
factor for upscaling, for both WRF and crop 
insurance.  
 
Cashew: the economic viability to replicate WRF 
and insurance for other value chains is not 
evident.  In the Burkinabe cashew sector neither 
WRF nor crop insurance currently exists. Cashew 
nuts can be stored, and in most seasons the price 
tends to rise after the harvest. However, in the 
last season the prices were already very high in 
the harvest season, which makes warehousing a 
less attractive option.
 5. Conclusions and perspectives 
The risk management tools of FARMAF – 
WRF and crop insurance – have indeed 
facilitated the farmers’ access to credit, be 
it at a modest scale so far. They have 
alleviated the constraints of guarantees 
(WRF) and agricultural risk (insurance). 
One (large) MFI has offered substantial 
interest rate reductions for the WRF 
loans, in view of reduced credit risk and 
monitoring cost.  
The upscaling potential of both 
mechanisms is promising but conditional. 
For WRF, the main constraint lies in the 
availability of warehouse infrastructure: 
expansion of warehouses depends highly 
on public subsidies and development 
agencies.  
For crop insurance, the marketability of 
the insurance among farmers remains 
fragile, and the distribution channels for 
the insurance are limited. In both cases, 
the MFIs’ limited loan capital can be an 
obstacle to scaling up their agricultural 
credit portfolio. 
Replication of the risk management tools 
to a different value chain like cashew 
seems technically possible, but it would 
require further investigation and product 
adaptation to corroborate the economic 
viability. Lessons may be learnt from 
Tanzania, where WRF is being done in  
 
the cashew chain, not so much to gain 
from price movements but more to 
finance aggregation, especially by 
farmers’ groups, cooperatives and other 
traders. 
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